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Abstract. This paper presents novel bilevel leader-follower portfolio selection problems in which the
financial intermediary becomes a decision-maker. This financial intermediary decides on the unit transaction
costs for investing in some securities, maximizing its benefits, and the investor chooses his optimal portfolio,
minimizing risk and ensuring a given expected return. Hence, transaction costs become decision variables
in the portfolio problem, and two levels of decision-makers are incorporated: the financial intermediary and
the investor. These situations give rise to general Nonlinear Programming formulations in both levels of
the decision process. We present different bilevel versions of the problem: financial intermediary-leader,
investor-leader, and social welfare; besides, their properties are analyzed. Moreover, we develop Mixed
Integer Linear Programming formulations for some of the proposed problems and effective algorithms for
some others. Finally, we report on some computational experiments performed on data taken from the Dow
Jones Industrial Average, and analyze and compare the results obtained by the different models.
Key words: Portfolio Optimization, bilevel programming, combinatorial optimization, pricing prob-
lems, transaction costs, Conditional Value at Risk measure (CVaR).
1 Introduction
The classical model in portfolio optimization was originally proposed by Markowitz in 1952 [27]. This
model has served as the initial point for the development of modern portfolio theory. Over time, portfolio
optimization problems have become more realistic, incorporating real-life aspects that make the resulting
portfolios more cost-effective than the alternatives that do not consider them [8, 13, 20, 23, 25]. Transaction
costs can be seen as one of these important actual features to be included in portfolio optimization. These
costs are those incurred by the investors when buying and selling assets on financial markets, charged by the
brokers, the financial institutions or the market makers playing the role of intermediary. Transaction costs
usually include banks and brokers commissions, fees, etc. These commissions or fees have a direct impact on
the portfolio, especially for individual or small investors, since they will determine the net returns, reducing
them and decreasing also the budget available for future investments [3, 4, 18].
To the best of our knowledge, in the existing literature, transaction costs are assumed to be given
[10, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29]. They can be a fixed cost applied to each selected security in the portfolio; or
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a variable cost to be paid which depends on the amount invested in each security included in the portfolio
(see e.g. [3, 4, 11, 23, 25, 34, 35] and the references therein). This dependence can be proportional to the
investment or given by a fixed cost that is only charged if the amount invested exceeds a given threshold, or
by some other functional form (see e.g. [4, 14, 17, 23, 25] and the references therein). But in any case, unit
transaction costs are known and predetermined in the optimization process. Nevertheless, it is meaningful
to analyze the situations where transaction costs can be decision variables set by financial institutions so
that they are trying to maximize its profit as part of the decision process that leads to optimal portfolios
for the investors.
The portfolio optimization problem considered in this paper is based on a single-period model of invest-
ment and incorporates a transaction costs setting phase. We assume that there are two decision-makers
involved in the situation: on the one hand, the investor and on the other hand, the broker specialist, market
maker or financial institution (that we will call from now on, for simplicity broker-dealer). At the beginning
of a period, an investor allocates his capital among various assets and during the investment period, each
asset generates a random rate of return. Moreover, we consider that the broker-dealer can charge some unit
transaction costs on the securities selected by the investor trying to maximize its benefits but anticipating
the rational response of the investor. This is a pricing phase in which the broker-dealer decides on how much
is going to charge to the investor for the traded securities. Considering unit transaction costs as a decision
variable of the model is a novel element in portfolio optimization and this is one of the main contributions of
this paper. Then, at the end of the period, the result for the investor is a variation of his capital (increased
or decreased) which is measured by the weighted average of the individual rates of return minus commissions
or fees. In addition, the result for the broker-dealer is the amount paid by the investor, which depends on
the costs set on the traded securities included in the portfolio chosen by the investor.
Based on the structure of financial markets, we assume a hierarchical relationship between the parties
involved in the portfolio problem, that is, we define a natural problem in which the broker-dealer sets the
unit transaction costs first, trying to anticipate the rational response of the investor. This hierarchical
analysis of the portfolio problem has not been addressed before and it is another contribution of our paper.
Once the costs are fixed, the investor chooses his optimal portfolio. For the sake of completeness, we also
analyze the case in which the investor chooses his portfolio first, and after that, the broker-dealer sets the
transaction costs. In order to model these hierarchical structures, we use a bilevel optimization approach
(see e.g. [2, 9, 16, 33]). Furthermore, we consider a social welfare problem where both, broker-dealer and
investor, cooperate to maximize their returns. We assume in the different problems that all economic or
financial information is common knowledge and that all the decision-makers in the problem have access to
it.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) it incorporates for the first time the
above hierarchical approaches with two-levels of decision-makers on portfolio optimization problems (the
broker-dealer sets unit transaction costs trying to maximize its benefits, whereas the investor minimizes
risk while ensuring a given expected return [5, 6]); 2) it introduces transaction costs as decision variables
controlled by the broker-dealer; and 3) it develops different bilevel programming formulations to obtain
optimal solutions for the considered problems. This paper introduces new models for the bilevel portfolio
optimization problem. As far as we know, bilevel models for the portfolio selection that set unit transaction
costs as decision variables of the problem have not been considered in the literature before.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the preliminaries and the notation used
throughout the paper. In Section 3, we present the problem in which the broker-dealer is the leader and
we develop two different Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) formulations to solve such problem.
Section 4 introduces the investor-leader problem and develops a Linear Programming (LP) formulation for it.
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In the more general case where additional constraints are required on the portfolio selection, it is presented
a convergent iterative algorithm based on an “ad hoc” decomposition of the model. Next, in Section 5, it
is addressed a social welfare problem . There, we propose a MILP formulation and an algorithm based on
Benders decomposition for solving it. Section 6 is devoted to reporting on the computational study of the
different problems and solution methods discussed in the previous sections. Our results are based on data
taken from Dow Jones Industrial Average. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of securities considered for an investment, B ⊆ N a subset of securities in
which the broker-dealer can charge unit transaction costs to the investor and R := N \ {B}. In most cases,
B = N , but there is no loss of generality to consider that B is a proper subset of N .
First, we assume that the broker-dealer can price security j ∈ B from a discrete set, with cardinality sj ,
of admissible costs, Pj = {cj1, ..., cjsj}, and the broker-dealer’s goal is to maximize its benefit. Further, we
consider proportional transaction costs: the cost charged by the broker-dealer per security is proportional
to the amount invested in such security. Hence, the broker-dealer’s decision variables are unit transaction
costs (commissions, fees, ...) to be charged (proportionally) to the securities.
Let x = (xj)j=1,...,n denote a vector of decision variables: xj being the weight of security j in the portfolio.
We only assume that the invested capital can not exceed the available budget and non-negativity, i.e.,
x :
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ 1, xj ≥ 0, for j = 1, ..., n.
This budget constraint is the minimum requirement on the structure of the portfolios. Nevertheless and
without loss of generality, we could have assumed that some other linear constraints are imposed on the
structure of the requested portfolio x. All the results in this paper can be easily extended to more general
situations that consider polyhedral sets of constraints defining the admissible set of portfolios.
Let us denote by pj the unit transaction cost chosen by the broker-dealer to charge security j, j ∈ B.
Then, for a given portfolio x (fixed), the problem faced by the broker-dealer can be modeled using the
following set of binary decision variables: ajk = 1 if cost cjk is assigned to pj , this is, if pj = cjk; ajk = 0
otherwise. Thus, to maximize his profit the broker-dealer solves the following problem:
max
∑
j∈B
pjxj (PricP)
s.t. pj =
sj∑
k=1
cjkajk, j ∈ B, (1)
sj∑
k=1
ajk = 1, j ∈ B, (2)
ajk ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj . (3)
If no further constraints are imposed on costs the above is a valid formulation. However, in general, we
will assume without loss of generality that the set of costs for the broker-dealer can be restricted to belong
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to some polyhedron P, allowing P = R|B|+ . This can be easily included in the above formulation with the
following constraint:
p ∈ P. (4)
We observe that, if x is known, and constraint (4) is not included, the above problem is easy to solve
(see Proposition 3): the broker-dealer will set transaction costs to the maximum ones among those available
for each security. Nevertheless, if the portfolio is unknown (to be decided by the investor) or additional
constraints, such as regulation constraints, are imposed into the model, the problem becomes more difficult
to be solved, since there exists no explicit expression for an optimal solution.
Moreover, we suppose that the investor wants to reduce the risk of his investment while ensuring a given
expected return. At this point, several risk measures could be considered, among them variance of returns,
Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), Gini’s Mean Difference, etcetera.
(Here, we refer the reader to [22] for further details on the topic.) In this paper, we have focused on a
portfolio optimization problem based on the CVaR risk measure. This risk measure aims to avoid large
losses: for a specific probability level α, the CVaR measures the conditional expectation of the smallest
returns with a cumulative probability α, that is, the average return of the given size (quantile) of worst
realizations [22, 31, 32]. Therefore, we assume that the investor’s goals are to maximize its CVaR and, at
the same time, to ensure that a minimum expected reward µ0 is obtained with his portfolio.
There exist in the literature different ways of accounting for the transaction costs into the portfolio
model [25, 26]. For instance, including them in the objective function [1, 30, 35], subtracting them from the
expected return [12, 24], reducing the capital available for the investment [35], etcetera. We assume in our
approach that transaction costs are directly removed from the expected return.
In order to model the above situation, we consider that the rate of return of each security j ∈ N is
represented by a random variable Rj with a given mean µj = E(Rj). Each portfolio x defines a random
variable Rx =
∑n
j=1Rjxj that represents the portfolio rate of return (its expected value can be computed as
µ(x) =
∑n
j=1 µjxj). We consider T scenarios, each of them with probability pit, t = 1, ..., T , and assume that
for each random variable Rj its realization, rjt, under the scenario t is known. Thus, once the broker-dealer
has set the transaction costs, p, the realization of the portfolio rate of return Rx under scenario t is given
as yt =
∑n
j=1 rjtxj −
∑
i∈B pixi.
With this information, we assume that the investor wants to maximize the CVaRα, namely the condi-
tional expectation of the smallest returns with cumulative probability α, while ensuring a minimum expected
return µ0. Thus, the portfolio optimization problem that the investor wants to solve can be formulated as:
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt (CVaRP)
s.t. yt =
n∑
j=1
rjtxj −
∑
i∈B
pixi, t = 1, ..., T, (5)
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0, (6)
dt ≥ η − yt, t = 1, ..., T, (7)
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (8)
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ 1, (9)
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xj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n, (10)
Observe that η is a continuous variable that models the α Value at Risk, V aRα, namely the value of
the minimum threshold for which the probability of the scenarios with a return less than or equal to η is at
least α.
Next, (5) and (6) are the scenario constraints. Constraint (5) gives the expected return in each scenario.
Note that, the expected return in each scenario is for the net rate of returns,
∑n
j=1 rjtxj , minus the trans-
action rates
∑
i∈B pixi. Whereas constraint (6) ensures an expected return of, at least, µ0. The objective
function and the set of constraints (7) and (8) model the CVaR (see Mansini et. al [22] for details). And
finally, the sets of constraints (9) and (10) force x to define a portfolio.
We note also that by choosing different values for the parameters α and µ0, in the formulation above,
different types of investors (i.e., different level of attitude towards risk) can be incorporated in the model.
3 Bilevel broker-dealer-leader Investor-follower Portfolio Problem (BLIFP)
We start analyzing a hierarchical structure in the financial markets in which the broker-dealer sets the
transaction costs first, and after that, the investor chooses his portfolio. Observe that in this situation, the
problem faced from the investor point of view reduces to a portfolio selection, under the considered criterion,
which in this case is to hedge against risk maximizing the average α-quantile of his smallest returns (CVaRα).
Therefore, we study this situation from the point of view of both the financial intermediary and the investor,
simultaneously, which is a novel perspective.
We model the situation as a bilevel leader-follower problem in which the broker-dealer has to fix the
transaction costs, from the polyhedral set P ∈ R|B|, maximizing his benefits by assuming that, after his
decision is made, the investor will choose his optimal portfolio.
Using the bilevel optimization framework, the BLIFP can be modeled as follows:
max
∑
j∈B
pjxj (BLIFP0)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Bank Constraints)
x ∈ argmax η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt,
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10). (Investor Constraints)
Our goal is to solve the above bilevel programming model to provide answers to the new portfolio
optimization problem. We propose two different MILP formulations with the aim of making a computational
comparison to check which one is more effective.
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3.1 Formulation BLIFP1
The main difficulty in handling BLIFP0 is that some of its decision variables are constrained to be optimal
solutions of a nested optimization problem. In order to overcome that issue we observe that the follower
problem in BLIFP0 is linear on x when p is given. This allows us to easily compute its exact dual as:
min β + µ0µ (Dual1)
s.t. β −
T∑
t=1
(rjt − pj)δt ≥ 0, j ∈ B, (11)
β −
T∑
t=1
rjtδt ≥ 0, j ∈ R, (12)
−
T∑
t=1
γt = 1, (13)
γt ≥ −pit
α
, t = 1, ..., T, (14)
γt + δt + pitµ = 0, t = 1, ..., T, (15)
γt ≤ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (16)
µ ≤ 0, β ≥ 0. (17)
We note in passing that variables δt, µ, γt and β, are the dual variables associated to constraints (5), (6),
(7) and (9), respectively. Therefore, they can be interpreted as multipliers explaining the marginal variation
of the objective function values as a function of the corresponding constraints’ right-hand-sides. Nevertheless,
we do not go into details in the economic insights of this dual model, since our use is instrumental to obtain
a single level reformulation of the hierarchical model.
Then, BLIFP0 can be reformulated, applying the Strong Duality Theorem, including the constraints of
the primal and dual problem together with the equation that matches the objective values of the follower
primal and dual problems. Thus, BLIFP0 is equivalent to solving this new mathematical programming
model:
max
∑
j∈B
pjxj
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Bank Constraints)
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = β + µ0µ, (18)
(5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (Investor Constraints)
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17). (Dual Constraints)
We can observe that in the above formulation we have some bilinear terms, pjxj and pjδt that appear in
the leader objective function and constraints (5) and (11). In order to solve the problem using off-the-shelf
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solvers, they can be linearized ‘a la’ McKormick, [28], giving rise to another exact MILP formulation for the
bilevel problem.
Indeed, since pj =
∑sj
k=1 cjkajk, ∀j ∈ B, we could substitute the terms pjxj =
∑sj
k=1 cjkaˆjk adding
variables aˆjk, ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , and the following set of constraints:
aˆjk ≤ xj , j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ xj − (1− ajk), j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj .
(19)
Furthermore, this linearization can be simplified. Observe that it is sufficient to include in (BLIFP0)
variables aˆjk and constraints
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (20)
from (19) and to substitute the variables xj =
∑sj
k=1 aˆjk,∀j ∈ B. We obtain in this manner an equivalent,
smaller formulation with the bilinear terms ajkxj linearized for all j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , but with less
constraints and decision variables.
Following a similar argument we can linearize the products pjδt =
∑sj
k=1 cjkajkδt. To do that, take M a
sufficiently large positive number and define the new variables δˆjkt = ajkδt, ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T .
This set of variables together with the following family of constraints linearize all the bilinear terms:
δˆjkt ≤ δt, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≤Majk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≥ δt − (1− ajk)M, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T.
(21)
Combining the above elements, all together, we obtain a valid MILP formulation for BLIFP:
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk (BLIFP1)
s.t.
sj∑
k=1
ajk = 1, j ∈ B, (2)
ajk ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (3)
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = β + µ0µ (18)
yt =
∑
j∈B
rjt
( sj∑
k=1
aˆjk
)
+
∑
j∈R
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk, t = 1, ..., T, (22)
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T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0, (6)
dt ≥ η − yt, t = 1, ..., T, (7)
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (8)∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
aˆjk +
∑
j∈R
xj ≤ 1, (23)
xj ≥ 0, j ∈ R, (10)
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (20)
β −
T∑
t=1
(
rjtδt −
sj∑
k=1
cjkδˆjkt
)
≥ 0, j ∈ B, (24)
β −
T∑
t=1
rjtδt ≥ 0, j ∈ R, (12)
−
T∑
t=1
γt = 1, (13)
γt ≥ −pit
α
, t = 1, ..., T, (14)
γt + δt + pitµ = 0, t = 1, ..., T, (15)
γt ≤ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (16)
µ ≤ 0, β ≥ 0, (17)
δˆjkt ≤ δt, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≤Majk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≥ δt − (1− ajk)M, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T,
δˆjkt ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , t = 1, ..., T.
(21)
The above long formulation can be easily understood once the different sets of constraints are grouped
by meaningful blocks. We observe that (2), (3) and (4) are the constraints that define the feasible domain of
the broker-dealer problem. Constraint (18) imposes the strong duality condition among the primal and dual
formulation of the follower problem. Next, (22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10) and (20) are the constraints that
correctly define the linearized version of the investor subproblem. Finally, the constraints that come from
the linearized version of the dual of the follower problem are (24),(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and(21).
Using these blocks of constraints BLIFP1 can be written in the following compact form.
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk (BLIFP1)
s.t. (2), (3), (4), (Linear broker-dealer Constraints)
(18), (Strong Duality Constraint)
(22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10), (20), (Linear investor Constraints 1)
(24), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (21).
(Linear Dual Constraints)
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This valid formulation of BLIFP1 requires to set a valid value for the big-M constraint. Setting an
appropriate value is important to improve the performance of the resulting MIP. In the following, we prove
the existence of a valid upper bound for such a value.
Proposition 1. Let B(p) be the set of all full rank submatrices of the matrix representing the constraints of
problem Dual1 in standard form, where p is a fixed set of cost values, and let BS(p) be the set of all matrices
that result from B(p) replacing, one each time, their columns by the RHS of that problem. Moreover, let
∆(p) := min{|det(B)| : B ∈ B(p)} and ∆S(p) = max{|det(B)| : B ∈ BS(p)}.
Then UBδ := max
p
∆S(p)/∆(p) is a valid upper bound for the big-M constant in BLIFP1.
Proof. It is easy to observe that for each fixed set of costs p, M ≤ maxt=1,...,T δt. Therefore the proof reduces
to bound the terms δt.
From constraint (15) in formulation Dual1 we know that δt = −γt − pitµ, ∀t = 1, ..., T, which implies
that δt ≥ 0 for all t = 1, ..., T , since µ ≤ 0, and δt ≤ 0, and pit ≥ 0 for all t = 1, ..., T .
We observe that β + µ0µ is bounded for any µ0 and for any set of costs p (recall that this o.f. gives a
CVaR). If we denote by rmax = max
j=1,...,n,t=1,...,T
rjt, rmin = min
j=1,...,n,t=1,...,T
rjt and cmax = max
j=1,...,n, k=1,...,sj
cjk,
then rmin − cmax ≤ β + µ0µ ≤ rmax. This implies that the solution of Dual1 is attained at an extreme
point and therefore no rays have to be considered. Next, the extreme points of the feasible regions are
solutions of systems of full dimensional equations taken from the constraint matrix of Dual1 in standard
form. Therefore, applying Cramer’s rule we obtain that, at the extreme points, the values of any variable
δt for all t = 1, . . . , T satisfy: δt ≤ ∆S(p)/∆(p). Next, letting p vary on the finite set of possible costs we
obtain that δt ≤ max
p
∆S(p)/∆(p).
This bound is only of theoretical interest and in our computational experiments, we have set it empirically
to be more accurate.
3.2 Formulation BLIFP2
In this section, we derive an alternative formulation for BLIFP based on the representation of the costs as
pjxj =
∑sj
k=1 cjkaˆjk in the follower problem before its dual problem is obtained. This artifact produces an
alternative single level model that we will analyze in the following.
Let us consider the CVaR problem in BLIFP0, and let us linearize the products of variables pixi, as in
the previous formulation. This way we obtain:
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
s.t. yt =
∑
j∈B
rjt
( sj∑
k=1
aˆjk
)
+
∑
j∈R
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk, t = 1, ..., T, (22)
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0, (6)
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dt ≥ η − yt, t = 1, ..., T, (7)
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (8)∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
aˆjk +
∑
j∈R
xj ≤ 1, (23)
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n, (10)
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj . (20)
Once again, to ease presentation, we write the above formulation in the following compact format.
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
s.t. (22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10), (20). (Linear investor Constraints 1)
Its dual problem is:
min β + µ0µ+
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
ajkσjk (Dual2)
s.t. (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
β −
T∑
t=1
rjtδt +
T∑
t=1
cjkδt + σjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (25)
σjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj . (26)
Therefore, we can replace in BLIFP0 the nested optimization problem on the CVaR including the group
of constraints in (Linear investor Constraints 1) and (12)-(17), (25), (26), that will be referred from now on
as (Dual2 Constraints), together with the strong duality condition given by
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = β + µ0µ+
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
ajkσjk.
The combination of all these elements results in the following alternative valid formulation for BLIFP0.
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk
s.t. (2), (3), (4) (Broker-dealer Constraints)
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = β + µ0µ+
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
ajkσjk (27)
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(22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10), (20), (Linear investor Constraints 1)
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(25), (26).
(Dual2 Constraints)
The formulation above still contains bilinear terms, namely ajkσjk, in constraint (27). Therefore, we
linearize them as in BLIFP1 and we obtain another valid MILP formulation for BLIFP.
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk (BLIFP2)
s.t. (2), (3), (4) (Linear broker-dealer Constraints)
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = β + µ0µ+
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
σˆjk, (28)
(22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10), (20), (Linear investor Constraints 1)
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(25), (26).
(Dual2 Constraints)
σˆjk ≤ σjk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
σˆjk ≤Majk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
σˆjk ≥ σjk −M(1− ajk), j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj
σˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
(29)
Again, this valid formulation for BLIFP2 requires to prove the existence of a valid upper bound for the
big-M constant in (29. In the following, we prove that a valid upper bound for such a value does exist.
Proposition 2. Let UBδ be the bound obtained in Proposition 1 and LBβ = min
p
∆S(p)/∆(p). Then
max{T (rmax − cmin)UBδ − LBβ, 0} is a valid upper bound for M in BLIFP2.
Proof. It is easy to observe that M = max
j∈B,k=1,...,sj
{σjk} is a valid upper bound.
Since σjk is being minimized (it is minimized in Dual2) and it must satisfy constraints (25) and (26),
there always exists, ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , an optimal solution where these variables get the values:
σjk =
{
0, if β +
∑T
t=1(cjk − rjt)δt ≥ 0
−β +∑Tt=1(rjt − cjk)δt, otherwise.
Because β ≥ 0 by definition, if β +∑Tt=1(cjk − rjt)δt is negative, then ∑Tt=1(cjk − rjt) ≤ 0 and therefore∑T
t=1(rjt − cjk) ≥ 0.
Consequently the maximum value of this variable would be max{0, T (rmax − cmin)UBδ − LBβ}, where
UBδ and LBβ are found by doing a similar discussion as in the Proposition 1.
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A first comparison of the above two models, namely BLIFP1 and BLIFP2, sheds some light on their
problem solving difficulty. For the sake of simplicity, we denote by d =
∑
j∈B |sj | the number of different
admissible costs in the models. Table 1 shows the number of binary and continuous variables and constraints
in both models.
Binary Continuous Constraints
BLIFP1 d R+ 5T + d+ dT + 3 2|B|+ 6T + 2|R|+ 2d+ 4dT + 6
BLIFP2 d R+ 4T + 3d+ 3 |B|+ 5T + |R|+ 7d+ 5
Table 1: number of variables and constraints in models BLIFP1 and BLIFP2
The smaller dimension of BLIFP2 explains what we observe later in the computational experience:
BLIFP2 is solved more efficiently than BLIFP1 (see Section 6).
4 Bilevel Investor-leader broker-dealer-follower Portfolio Problem (ILBFP)
For the sake of completeness, in this section, we consider the reverse situation to the one that has been
analyzed in Section 3, i.e., a hierarchical structure in the financial market where the investor acts first and
once his portfolio x is chosen the broker-dealer sets transaction costs. Although one could claim that this
situation may be atypical in actual financial markets, we want to analyze this case from a theoretical point
of view. Moreover, we wish to analyze its implications depending on different broker-dealers and investors
profiles. See Section 6 for a comparative analysis. This situation leads to a bilevel leader-follower model
in which the investor (leader) has to optimize his utility (maximize the CVaR ensuring a given expected
reward, µ0) by assuming that once he has chosen the portfolio, the broker-dealer (follower) will maximize
his benefits setting the applicable transaction costs.
We can formulate the problem as:
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt (ILBFP0)
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (Investor Constraints)
p ∈ argmax
∑
j∈B
pjxj , (30)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4). (Broker-dealer Constraints)
We state in the following proposition that if no further polyhedral constraints are imposed on possible
costs, i.e., P = R|B|+ , fixing the transaction costs to their maximum possible values is always an optimal
solution of the follower (broker-dealer) problem.
Proposition 3. Let PricP be the follower broker-dealer problem, not including constraint (4),
in the problem ILBFP0. Let x be a given portfolio and let p+j = max
k=1,...,sj
cjk ∀j ∈ B. Then p+j , ∀j ∈ B,
is an optimal solution of PricP.
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Using the previous result, the ILBFP0 can be simplified, in the cases in which constraint (4) is not
included since the nested optimization problem is replaced by the explicit form of an optimal solution. This
results in a valid linear programming formulation to solve the problem.
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt (ILBFP-LP)
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (Investor Constraints)
yt =
n∑
j=1
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
p+j xj
 , t = 1, ..., T.
Nevertheless, the above result can not be extended to the case in which a more general polyhedron P
defines the admissible set of transaction costs, and a single level MILP formulation can neither be obtained.
To solve ILBFP, in this more general case, we propose an ‘ad hoc’ algorithm. To justify its validity we
need the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let us define λ =
∑
j∈B pjxj, and let us denote by Ω the set containing the feasible commissions
and fees rates of the broker-dealer problem in P, denoted by pint. The problem ILBFP0 is equivalent to:
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
ptdt (ILBFP-Compact)
st. yt =
n∑
j=1
rjtxj − (λ) , t = 1, ..., T,
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0,
dt ≥ η − yt, t = 1, ..., T,
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T,
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ 1,
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n,
λ ≥
∑
j∈B
pint,jxj , pint ∈ Ω.
Proof. We prove first that, maximizing the objective function η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt in ILBFP0 is equivalent
to maximizing η(1− cx) + 1
α
∑
t∈T′
n∑
j=1
pitrjtxj − cxλ, where cx =
∑
t∈T′
pit
α > 0 and T
′ := {t = 1, ..., n :
η − yt ≥ 0}. Observe that the constraints in ILBFP-Compact imply that dt = max{0, η − yt} and
yt =
∑
j∈B rjtxj −
∑
j∈B pjxj for all t = 1, ..., T . Therefore the objective value in the problem satisfies the
following rewriting:
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max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt = max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pit max{0, η − yt}
= max η − 1
α
∑
t∈T′
pit(η − yt)
= max η(1− cx) + 1
α
∑
t∈T′
pit
∑
j∈B
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
pjxj

= max η(1− cx) + 1
α
∑
t∈T′
pit
∑
j∈B
rjtxj
− cxλ. (31)
Let λ =
∑
j∈B pjxj . The expression (31) proves that the objective function of ILBFP-Compact
depends on λ with a negative coefficient.
Secondly, we have that, for a given portfolio x, the optimal value λ¯ of the follower problem is
λ¯ = max
∑
j∈B
pjxj
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Broker-dealer Constraints)
and it is equivalent to evaluate the objective function in all the feasible points and to choose the largest one:
λ¯ = max
∑
j∈B
pint,jxj , pint ∈ Ω.
Since cx ≥ 1, λ is positive, and λ is being minimized in (31), the follower problem in ILBFP0, can be
replaced by
λ ≥
∑
j∈B
pint,jxj , pint ∈ Ω,
and the result follows.
Observe that, if the set of points in Ω were explicitly known, ILBFP-Compact would be a MILP
compact formulation with very likely an exponential number of constraints for the general case of ILBFP0.
However, the points in the set Ω are usually difficult to enumerate a priori.
The idea of our algorithm is to start with an incomplete formulation of ILBFP-Compact and reinforce
it with a new inequality, coming from a new point in Ω, after each new iteration of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1:
Initialization Choose a feasible portfolio x0. Set CV aR0 = +∞
Iteration τ = 1, 2, . . .
14
• Solve the broker-dealer (follower) problem for xτ−1. Let pτ be an optimal solution.
• Solve the incomplete formulation:
max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt (ILBFP-Incomplete
τ )
st. yt =
n∑
j=1
rjtxj − (λ) , t = 1, ..., T,
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0
dt ≥ η − yt, t = 1, ..., T,
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T,
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ 1,
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n,
λ ≥
∑
j∈B
pνjxj , ν = 1, ..., τ.
Let χτ = (xτ , yτ , ητ , dτ ), and let (χτ , λτ ) be an optimal solution and CV aRτ the optimal value.
– If (χτ , λτ ) is feasible in ILBFP-Incompleteτ , (χτ−1, pτ ) are optimal solutions of ILBFP0,
and CV aRτ the optimal value. END.
– If (χτ , λτ ) is not feasible in ILBFP-Incompleteτ , go to iteration τ := τ + 1.
We prove in the following result the optimality of the solution obtained in Algorithm 1 and also its
finiteness.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 finishes in a finite number of iterations with an optimal solution of ILBFP0.
Proof. We start guaranteeing the finiteness of the algorithm. On the one hand, the number of feasible
solutions of the broker-dealer problem is finite, then the number of different cuts λ ≥ ∑j∈B pτjxj that can
be added to the incomplete formulation is also finite. On the other hand, if a repeated cut is added then,
xτ−1 is feasible in ILBFP-Incompleteτ , since ILBFP-Incompleteτ is equal to ILBFP-Incompleteτ−1,
and then the algorithm stops. Therefore the algorithm finishes in a finite number of iterations.
We continue now proving the optimality of the solution obtained. Let us denote by CV aR∗ the optimal
value of ILBFP0, that by Theorem 1 is also the optimal value of ILBFP-Compact.
First, assume that (χτ−1, λτ−1) satisfies the stopping criterion. Then, it is clear that (χτ−1, λτ−1) is
also feasible in ILBFP-Incompleteτ and CV aRν ≤ CV aRν−1 for all ν = 1, ..., τ , by construction. Hence,
(χτ , λτ ) is also optimal in ILBFP-Incompleteτ and CV aRτ−1 = CV aRτ .
Second, we have that CV aR∗ ≤ CV aRτ always holds, since the polyhedron describing the feasible region
of ILBFP-Compact is included in the one defining the feasible region in ILBFP-Incompleteτ .
Finally, we have that if (χτ−1, pτ ) is feasible in ILBFP0, then CV aR∗ = CV aRτ and it is an optimal
solution of ILBFP0. Therefore, it remains to prove that (χτ−1, pτ ) is feasible in ILBFP0.
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Clearly χτ−1 verifies constraints (7), (9), (6), (8), (10), since they are all included in the incomplete
formulation, and also, xτ−1, pτ verify constraints p ∈ argmax
∑
j∈B
pjxj , (1), (2), (3) and (4), since
pτ ∈ argmax
∑
j∈B
pjx
τ−1
j
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4). (Broker-dealer Constraints)
To complete the proof we need to check that constraint (5) is also satisfied.
Since pτ ∈ argmax
∑
j∈B
pjx
τ−1
j , then
∑
j∈B p
τ
jx
τ−1
j ≥
∑
j∈B pjx
τ−1
j for any cost p verifying (1), (2), (3)
and (4). Using the same arguments that in Theorem 1 it follows that variable λ is being minimized in
ILBFP-Incompleteτ , thus λτ =
∑
j∈B p
τ
jx
τ−1
j and then constraint (5) holds.
5 The Maximum Social Welfare Problem (MSWP)
In some actual situations, the investor and the broker-dealer may have an incentive to work together to
improve the social welfare of society. They can agree to cooperate and share risk and benefits to improve,
in this way, their solutions by designing a joint strategy.
We also analyze this problem for the sake of completeness and to compare the performance of this
situation where none of the parties has a hierarchical position over the other one. We think that even if the
actual implementation of the cooperative model may be difficult, in a competitive actual market, one may
gain some insights into the problem through analysis.
In the social welfare model, we assume that both, broker-dealer and investor, cooperate. Let 0 < ξ < 1
be the marginal rate of substitution between the two objectives. That is, the rate at which one of the
parties can give up some units of one of the objective functions in exchange for another unit of the other one
while maintaining the same overall value. Then, the cooperative version of the problem can be written as a
weighted sum of the two objective functions of each party in the feasible region delimited by the constraints
of both problems:
max ξ
∑
j∈B
pjxj + (1− ξ)
(
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Broker-dealer Constraints)
(5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10). (Investor Constraints)
The above problem can be modeled as a MILP by linearizing the products of variables ajkxj ,∀j ∈ B
following the same scheme as in Section 3:
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max ξ
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk + (1− ξ)
(
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
)
(MSWP0)
s.t. (2), (3), (4), (Linear broker-dealer Constraints)
(22), (6), (7), (8), (23), (10), (20). (Linear investor Constraints 1)
For simplicity, in the remaining, we consider an unweighted maximum social welfare model where the
two objective functions
∑
j∈B
∑sj
k=1 cjkajk (broker-dealer) and η−
1
α
∑T
t=1 pitdt (investor) are simply added.
The following result proves that cooperation is always profitable for both parties in that the joint return
exceeds the sum of individual returns of each of them.
Proposition 4. An optimal solution of the unweighted maximum social welfare problem induces an objective
value that is greater than or equal to the sum of the optimal returns of the two parties in the same bilevel
problem in any of the hierarchical problems.
Proof. Any feasible solution of BLIFP0 and ILBFP0 is feasible in MSWP0 since all the constraints in
this last problem appear in the two former formulations. Therefore, the feasible region of MSWP0 includes
the feasible regions of both, BLIFP0 and ILBFP0 and the result follows.
5.1 Benders decomposition
We can also obtain a Benders decomposition, [7], in order to state a Benders like algorithm to solve MSWP0,
and compare the performance of both proposed methods to solve the problem.
Recall that the unweighted maximum welfare problem can be written as:
max
∑
j∈B
pjxj +
(
η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
)
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Broker-dealer Constraints)
(5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10). (Investor Constraints)
In order to apply Benders decomposition we reformulate MSWP0 as follows:
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk + q(y) (MSWP1)
s.t. (2), (3), (4) (Linear broker-dealer Constraints)
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (20)
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yt =
∑
j∈B
rjt
( sj∑
k=1
aˆjk
)
+
∑
j∈R
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk, t = 1, ..., T, (22)
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0, (6)
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
aˆjk +
∑
j∈R
xj ≤ 1, (23)
xj ≥ 0, j ∈ R, (10)
where
q(y) = max η − 1
α
T∑
t=1
pitdt
s.t.: dt − η ≥ −yt, t = 1, ..., T,
dt ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T.
Note that in q(y) we are essentially computing the CVaR for the given solution {yt : t = 1, . . . , T}.
Computing again its dual problem, the evaluation of q(y) can also be obtained as:
q(y) = min
T∑
t=1
−γtyt (PrimalP)
s.t.: γt ≥ −pit
α
, t = 1, ..., T,
−
T∑
t=1
γt = 1,
γt ≤ 0.
Observe that the above problem, which we define as the Primal Problem, is a continuous knapsack
problem with lower bounds, therefore it is well known that it can be solved by inspection. It suffices to
sort non-increasingly the yt values and assigning, in that order, to each variable γt the minimum feasible
amount.
Note that in the above formulation the feasible region does not depend on the variables in MSWP1, so
if we denote by Ω the set of extreme point solutions of the feasible region of PrimalP, q(y) is equivalent to:
q(y) = max q
s.t. q ≤
T∑
t=1
−γτt yt, γτ ∈ Ω. (32)
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Therefore, the problem MSWP0 with discrete costs can be written as:
max
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk + q (MasterP)
s.t. (2), (3), (4) (Linear broker-dealer Constraints)
aˆjk ≤ ajk, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj ,
aˆjk ≥ 0, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., sj , (20)
yt =
∑
j∈B
rjt
( sj∑
k=1
aˆjk
)
+
∑
j∈R
rjtxj −
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
cjkaˆjk, t = 1, ..., T, (22)
T∑
t=1
pityt ≥ µ0, (6)
∑
j∈B
sj∑
k=1
aˆjk +
∑
j∈R
xj ≤ 1, (23)
xj ≥ 0, j ∈ R, (10)
q ≤
T∑
t=1
γτyt, γ
τ ∈ Ω. (32)
This analysis allows us to state a Benders algorithm as follows:
Benders Algorithm:
Initialization Choose a solution y0 of the master problem, solve the primal problem PrimalP for the
chosen y0. Let γ0 be an optimal solution for PrimalP under y0 and q(y0) the corresponding optimal
value. Take Υ = {γ0} and go to iteration τ = 1.
Iteration τ = 1, 2, . . . Solve the master problem MasterP replacing Ω with Υ. Let y∗ and q∗ be optimal
solutions of such problem.
• If τ = 1 and q(y0) = q∗. END.
• If τ > 1 and q(y∗) = q∗. END.
• Otherwise, solve the primal problem PrimalP for y = y∗. Let γ∗ be an optimal solution of such
problem. Take γτ = γ∗, Υ = Υ ∪ {γτ}, and go to iteration τ := τ + 1.
6 Computational study and empirical application
This section is devoted to reporting some numerical experiments conducted to: 1) compare the effectiveness
of the methods proposed to solve the different problems; 2) analyze the form of the solutions within each
model; and 3) compare the profiles of the solutions, in terms of net values for the broker-dealer and expected
return for the investor, across the three defined problems.
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The computational experiments were carried out on a personal computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
2600 CPU, 3.40GHz with 16.0 GB RAM. The algorithms and formulations were implemented and solved by
using Xpress IVE 8.0.
In order to conduct the computational study, we take historical data from Dow Jones Industrial Average.
We considered daily returns of the 30 assets during one year (T = 251 scenarios), and these T historical
periods are considered as equiprobable scenarios (pit = 1/T ). Furthermore, to perform a richer comparison,
we consider different types of instances for the broker-dealer sets of possible transaction costs and different
risk profiles for the investor.
We assume that the broker-dealer charges transaction costs in a subset B of the securities. In the
instances we generated we compare the following cardinals for the set B: |B| = 30, 20, 10. In addition, each
cost pj , j ∈ B was chosen from a discrete set Pj = {cj1, ..., cjsj} of admissible values . These parameters sj
were randomly generated in the interval [0,K] with K = 5, 15, 50.
The next table gathers the nine different types of instances (A to I) considered in our computational
study:
K = 5 K = 15 K = 50
|B| = 30 A B C
|B| = 20 D E F
|B| = 10 G H I
Table 2: Types of instances for the sets of possible costs depending on the values of |B| and K
Once the set B and the parameter sj were set for each type of instance (A-I), we generate the possible
transaction costs cij as follows:
• randomly generated in the interval [0.001, 0.003] (cheaper costs) in approximately 15% of the securities,
• randomly generated in the interval [0.002, 0.008] (normal costs) in approximately 70% of the securities,
• randomly generated in the interval [0.006, 0.010] (more expensive costs) in approximately 15% of the
securities.
For each type of instance defined in Table 2, five different instances are generated and the average values
are reported in all the tables and figures.
Different investor profiles are also considered varying the values of parameters µ0 and α. We assume
three thresholds for the expected return µ0 = 0.0, 0.05, 0.1. This way, we are modeling investors willing
not to lose anything, or to win at least, 5% or 10% of their invested amount. In addition, we consider
five different CVaR risk levels, α = 0.01, 0.05, 0.5, 0.9. Note that usually, the smaller the α, the higher the
risk-aversion.
6.1 Comparing solution methods
This section compares the computational performance of the different methods proposed to solve each one
of the problems.
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For the first problem, BLIFP, we proposed two different formulations: BLIFP1 and BLIFP2. We
show in all our tables, the average CPU time expressed in seconds (CPU) and the number of instances (#)
solved to optimality (out of 5) for each formulation, with a time limit of 3600 seconds.
Table 3 is organized in three blocks of rows. Each block reports results for µ0 = 0.0, 0.05, 0.1, respectively.
Each row in the table refers to a type of instance (A, . . . , I). The columns are also organized in four blocks.
Each block reports the results for a different risk level (α).
It can be observed that BLIFP2 is always faster and it solves a higher number of problems than BLIFP1
to optimality. As anticipated in Section 3.2 this behavior is explained by the smaller dimension of BLIFP2
in terms of variables and constraints. For example, when α = 0.5 and µ = 0.0, BLIFP2 is able to solve all
the instances of types D and H in few seconds, while BLIFP1 is not able to solve any of these instances.
Therefore, we conclude that formulation BLIFP2 is more effective than BLIFP1 for solving BLIFP.
The second problem in our analysis is the one presented in Section 4, namely ILBFP. For this situation,
we have proposed a single level LP formulation ILBFP-LP and Algorithm 1 to solve the problem. We
report the results concerning this model (when no additional constrains on transaction costs are imposed in
the set of costs) in Table 4. It can be observed that the compact formulation is faster than the algorithm:
all the instances can be solved by using the LP formulation in less than 7 seconds, meanwhile, the algorithm
needs more than 100 seconds to solve some of them. However, the Algorithm 1 is also able to solve all the
instances, and, as discussed in Section 4, it can also be used when more general sets of costs are considered.
Finally, for the social welfare problem, MSWP, we have also proposed another single level formulation
MSWP0 and a Benders’ like algorithm. The primal problems in the Benders Algorithm were solved by
using the inspection method described in the previous section. We report the results concerning this model
in Table 5 with the same layout as Table 4. It can be observed that again the compact formulations is much
faster than the algorithm. In spite of that, the algorithm is also able to solve the considered instances.
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α = 0.05 α = 0.1 α = 0.5 α = 0.9
µ0 BLIFP1 BLIFP2 BLIFP1 BLIFP2 BLIFP1 BLIFP2 BLIFP1 BLIFP2
CPU # CPU # CPU # CPU # CPU # CPU # CPU # CPU #
0 A 3600 0 181 5 3600 0 916 4 3600 0 3291 1 3600 0 5 5
B 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3079 1
C 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0
D 3600 0 2 5 3204 1 17 5 3600 0 59 5 1603 3 2 5
E 3600 0 890 4 3600 0 2024 3 3600 0 3377 1 1882 3 3 5
F 3600 0 2895 1 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 2984 1 76 5
G 841 5 1 5 375 5 1 5 810 5 1 5 571 5 1 5
H 2282 2 2 5 3117 1 2 5 3600 0 7 5 2178 2 1 5
I 2959 1 1444 3 3600 0 1562 3 3600 0 939 4 1804 3 5 5
0.05 A 3600 0 28 5 3600 0 343 5 3600 0 3291 1 3156 1 5 5
B 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3079 1
C 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0
D 3600 0 2 5 3204 1 3 5 3600 0 59 5 2217 2 2 5
E 3600 0 110 5 3600 0 1923 3 3600 0 3377 1 1793 3 3 5
F 3600 0 2905 1 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 2930 1 76 5
G 841 5 1 5 375 5 1 5 810 5 1 5 62 5 1 5
H 2282 2 1 5 3117 1 2 5 3600 0 7 5 153 5 1 5
I 2959 1 930 4 3600 0 1575 3 3600 0 939 4 2439 2 5 5
0.1 A 3600 0 6 5 3600 0 23 5 3600 0 3291 1 3156 1 5 5
B 3600 0 616 5 3600 0 1326 4 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3079 1
C 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0 3600 0
D 3600 0 1 5 3204 1 2 5 3600 0 59 5 2217 2 2 5
E 3600 0 24 5 3600 0 55 5 3600 0 3377 1 1793 3 3 5
F 3600 0 1277 4 3600 0 2227 2 3600 0 3600 0 2930 1 76 5
G 841 5 1 5 375 5 1 5 810 5 1 5 62 5 1 5
H 2282 2 1 5 3117 1 1 5 3600 0 7 5 153 5 1 5
I 2959 1 1477 3 3600 0 736 4 3600 0 939 4 2439 2 5 5
Table 3: Comparison of the average CPU and number of instances (out of 5) solved to optimality, for BLIFP1 and BLIFP2
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6.2 Comparing solutions and risk profiles within problems
This section analyzes the results provided by the two hierarchical problems in terms of broker-dealer’s net
profit and risk and expected return attained by the investor.
Figure 1 compares the CVaR values obtained for the different risk profiles for BLIFP. Each piecewise
curve reports the CVaR values for different α-levels and µ0-levels and the nine markets profiles (A, . . . , I).
We observe that the CVaR always increases with the value of α, since this implies assuming more risk. It
can also be seen in these figures that, when the value of α increases, the CVaR for the different values of
µ0 becomes closer for each value of α. This can be explained because when α = 1, if the constraint that
the expected return must be greater or equal to 0 is satisfied, both problems become the same, then, the
bigger the α the more similar the results for different values of µ0. Furthermore, for a given α, the CVaR
for smaller µ0 is higher because in these cases the constraint on the expected return enlarges the feasible
region as compared with higher values of µ0.
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Figure 1: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP, for different α and µ0 levels
Figure 2 compares, with a similar organization as Figure 1, the broker-dealer net profit for different
investor’s risk profiles. Analogously, Figure 3 represents the expected return for the investor.
We observe in Figure 2 that the results of the broker-dealer net profit are bigger, in trend, for profiles
with smaller values of α, that is, for more risk-averse investments. In addition, we also show in Figure 3
that, in general, bigger expected returns are obtained for higher values of α. The reason for this is that by
increasing α one is considering a wider range of values to compute the CVaR, and then the result is a value
closer to the expected return (note that when α = 1 the expected return is equal to the CVaR).
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Figure 2: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP, for different values α and µ0 levels
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Figure 3: Values of the expected return for BLIFP, for different α and µ0 levels
Finally, to conclude with the analysis of BLIFP, we remark that the smaller the cardinality of the set B
the better the CVaR and expected returns for the investor, but the worse the broker-dealer net profit. This
is expected since we are reducing the number of securities where the broker-dealer could charge transaction
costs.
We proceed next to analyze the solutions of the second problem, namely ILBFP. We observe in Figure
25
4 the same trend that in the previous model: more risk-averse investments produce lower CVaR for the
investor (left-upper figure), and bigger profits for the broker-dealer (right-upper figure), and decreasing the
cardinality of the set B results in a reduction of the broker-dealer profit. The behavior of expected return
(lower figure) is similar to those observed in Figure 3 for the corresponding BLIFP.
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Figure 4: Values of the CVaR (left-above), broker-dealer profit (right-above) and expected return (below) for ILBFP, for
different α and µ0 levels
To finish this section, we consider the MSWP model. In this case, we have also included in our analysis
the comparison of the objective function of this problem, namely the broker-dealer net profit plus CVaR,
for the different risk profiles with respect to µ0 and α, and type of market (A, . . . , I). It can be seen in the
upper-right frame of Figure 5, that the objective value increases with the value of α. The same trend is
observed for the CVaR and the expected return (left figures). However, regarding the broker-dealer profit
we could not detect a clear pattern.
The interested reader is referred to the appendix, that includes all comparisons and graphical outputs
gathered in our study. Furthermore, one can find there a discrete Pareto front of MSWP for different
values of the parameter ξ.
26
A B C D E F G H I
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0 α:0.05, μ:0.0α:0.05, μ:0.05
α:0.05, μ:0.1
α:0.1, μ:0.0
α:0.1, μ:0.05
α:0.1, μ:0.1
α:0.5, μ:0.0
α:0.5, μ:0.05
α:0.5, μ:0.1
α:0.9, μ:0.0
α:0.9, μ:0.05
α:0.9, μ:0.1
INSTANCE
C
Va
R
A B C D E F G H I
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
α:0.05, μ:0.0
α:0.05, μ:0.05
α:0.05, μ:0.1
α:0.1, μ:0.0
α:0.1, μ:0.05
α:0.1, μ:0.1
α:0.5, μ:0.0
α:0.5, μ:0.05
α:0.5, μ:0.1
α:0.9, μ:0.0
α:0.9, μ:0.05
α:0.9, μ:0.1
INSTANCE
B
ro
ke
r-
de
al
er
 P
ro
fit
A B C D E F G H I
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 α:0.05, μ:0.0
α:0.05, μ:0.05
α:0.05, μ:0.1
α:0.1, μ:0.0
α:0.1, μ:0.05
α:0.1, μ:0.1
α:0.5, μ:0.0
α:0.5, μ:0.05
α:0.5, μ:0.1
α:0.9, μ:0.0
α:0.9, μ:0.05
α:0.9, μ:0.1
INSTANCE
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n
A B C D E F G H I
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
α:0.05, μ:0.0
α:0.05, μ:0.05
α:0.05, μ:0.1
α:0.1, μ:0.0
α:0.1, μ:0.05
α:0.1, μ:0.1
α:0.5, μ:0.0
α:0.5, μ:0.05
α:0.5, μ:0.1
α:0.9, μ:0.0
α:0.9, μ:0.05
α:0.9, μ:0.1
INSTANCE
C
Va
R
 +
 B
ro
ke
r-d
ea
le
r P
ro
fit
Figure 5: Values of the CVaR (upper-left), broker-dealer profit (upper-right), expected return (lower-left) and objective value
(lower-right) for different α and µ0 levels in MSWP,
6.3 Comparing solutions across problems
This last section of the computational results is devoted to comparing the solutions provided for the three
problems considered in this paper, namely BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP. The goal is to analyze the
solution across problems with respect to the goals of the two parties: broker-dealer net profit, CVaR levels
and expected returns. Due to page length limitations in the paper version, we have included in our figures
only some comparisons for certain risk profiles. The interested reader is referred again to the appendix,
where we report comparisons for a broader range of risk profiles.
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Figure 6: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
Figure 15 shows a comparison of the CVaR values attained in BLIFP and ILBFP for different risk
profiles (α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 and α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1, in the right and left figures, respectively).
We can observe in Figure 15 that for each risk profile, the CVaR values are always higher in BLIFP than
in ILBFP. Analogously, Figure 7 compares the values of the broker-dealer profit for the two hierarchical
problems. It is also remarkable that BLIFP always results in higher profit values for each risk profile and all
type of instances. In these comparisons, we do not include the values for the social welfare problem because
they are not comparable due to the existence of multiple solutions (with the same value for the objective
function but a very different balance between the distribution of the CVaR and the broker-dealer profit). As
we mentioned above, we emphasize that in all our experiments, BLIFP always gives higher profit for the
broker-dealer and better CVaR for the investor than ILBFP. In this regard, it seems beneficial for the two
parties to accept that the investor knows the transaction costs on the securities before setting his portfolio.
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Figure 7: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP, for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.5 and
µ0 = 0.1 (right)
The last comparisons across models refer to the value of the sum of broker-dealer profit plus the CVaR
of the investor, in Figure 8, and the expected return value, in Figure 9. These two figures show the
corresponding values attained by the three proposed problems, BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP, for the
different instances (A, . . . , I) and two different risk profiles (see figures captions). As theoretically proved in
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Proposition 4, we can observe in Figure 8 that the value of the sum of the broker-dealer profit plus the CVaR
of the investor is always greater for the social welfare model (MSWP) than for the other two hierarchical
problems, namely BLIFP and ILBFP. Finally, we compare the obtained expected return values for the
three problems. From Figure 9, we can not conclude any dominating relationship among the problems
with respect to the expected return value and therefore, the numerical experiments do not prescribe any
preference relationship regarding the expected return.
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Figure 8: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for the three problems, for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.5
and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Figure 9: Values of the expected return for the three problems, for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.0, (left) and for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05
(right)
7 Concluding remarks and extensions
We have presented three single-period portfolio optimization problems with transaction costs, considering
two different decision-makers: the investor and the financial intermediary. Including the financial interme-
diaries (broker-dealers) as decision-makers leads to the incorporation of the transaction costs as decision
variables in the portfolio selection problem. The action of both decision-makers was assumed to be hierar-
chical. We have considered the situations where each of these decision-makers is leader and have analyzed
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them. This hierarchical structure has been modeled using bilevel optimization. In addition, a social welfare
model has also been studied.
In all cases, it has been assumed that the broker-dealer has to choose the unit transaction costs, for
each security, from a discrete set of possible costs, maximizing its benefits, and that the investor aims to
minimize the risk (optimizing his CVaR), ensuring a given expected return. Considering continuous sets of
possible values for the transaction costs could be an interesting future research line.
In the considered models we assumed proportional transactions cost; however, other transaction costs
structures such as fixed transaction costs or convex piecewise linear costs have been considered in the
literature (for further details on transaction costs structures we refer the reader to [26]). These costs
structures could be incorporated in our models by slightly modifying the resolution methods and increasing
the complexity of problem-solving. For instance, in order to incorporate fixed fees and commissions, we
should include some binary variables determining whether the investor chooses a security or not, and then
accounting for its contribution to the transaction costs. The general tools from MILP can be adapted to
solve the problem with this new structure of costs. This could be another interesting future research line.
In order to solve the three proposed problems, MILP and LP formulations, as well as algorithms, have
been proposed. By making variations in the set of costs, and in the parameters to model the CVaR and the
expected return, α and µ0, different broker-dealer and investor profiles can be considered.
In our analysis in Sections 3 and 4, all the problems have been presented, for simplicity, with only one
follower. Nevertheless, they could be easily extended to more than one. In particular, in Section 3, the
problem has been studied from the broker-dealer point of view, that is, the broker-dealer aims to maximize
its benefit by assuming that once the costs for the securities are set, a single investor will choose his portfolio
according to the described goals. We remark that the same procedure could be applied to several followers
(investors). In fact, in that problem, F different profiles of followers (risk-averse, risk-taker, etc.) could be
considered, and the broker-dealer’s goal would be maximizing the overall benefit for any linear function of
its costs. This approach would allow the broker-dealer to improve the decision-making process in the cases
where the same costs have to be set for all the investors, but different investor’s profiles are considered.
A detailed computational study has been conducted using data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
We have compared the solution methods, the solutions and the risk profiles within problems, and the so-
lutions across them. From our computational experience, we have observed that the broker-dealer-leader
investor-follower problem results in better solutions for both, the broker-dealer and the investor, in compari-
son with the investor-leader broker-dealer-follower problem. Furthermore, the social welfare model problem,
as theoretically proved, in higher aggregated benefits.
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A Appendix
A.1 Comparing solutions and risk profiles within problems
Discrete Pareto front for MSWP
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Figure 10: Discrete Pareto front of the MSWP for different values of ξ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (from left to ritght) and
different risk profiles, for instances type A (left), B (right).
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Figure 11: Discrete Pareto front of the MSWP for different values of ξ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (from left to ritght) and
different risk profiles, for instances type C (left), D (right).
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Figure 12: Discrete Pareto front of the MSWP for different values of ξ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (from left to ritght) and
different risk profiles, for instances type E (left), F (right).
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Figure 13: Discrete Pareto front of the MSWP for different values of ξ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (from left to ritght) and
different risk profiles, for instances type G (left), H (right).
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Figure 14: Discrete Pareto front of the MSWP for different values of ξ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (from left to ritght) and
different risk profiles, for instances type I
A.2 Comparing solutions across problems
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Figure 15: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.05 (right)
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Figure 16: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0 (right)
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Figure 17: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Figure 18: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.05 (right)
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Figure 19: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0 (right)
A B C D E F G H I
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04 BLIFP
ILBFP
Instances
C
Va
R
A B C D E F G H I
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04 BLIFP
ILBFP
Instances
C
Va
R
Figure 20: Values of the CVaR for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0. and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Broker-dealer profit
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Figure 21: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.05 and
µ0 = 0.05 (right)
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Figure 22: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.1 and
µ0 = 0 (right)
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Figure 23: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.1 and
µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Figure 24: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.5 and
µ0 = 0.05 (right)
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Figure 25: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.9 and
µ0 = 0 (right)
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Figure 26: Values of the broker-dealer profit for BLIFP and ILBFP for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0. and
µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Broker-dealer profit + CVaR
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Figure 27: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0 (left) and
for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.05 (right)
A B C D E F G H I
−1.7
−1.6
−1.5
−1.4
−1.3
BLIFP
ILBFP
MSWP
Instances
C
Va
R
+B
ro
ke
r P
ro
fit
A B C D E F G H I
−0.88
−0.87
−0.86
−0.85
BLIFP
ILBFP
MSWP
Instances
C
Va
R
+B
ro
ke
r P
ro
fit
Figure 28: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and
for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0 (right)
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Figure 29: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and
for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Figure 30: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0 (left) and
for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.05 (right)
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Figure 31: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and
for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0 (right)
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Figure 32: Values of the broker-dealer profit + CVaR for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and
for α = 0. and µ0 = 0.1 (right)
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Figure 33: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.05
(right)
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Figure 34: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.05 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0
(right)
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Figure 35: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0.1 and µ0 = 0.1
(right)
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Figure 36: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0 (left) and for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.05
(right)
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Figure 37: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.5 and µ0 = 0.1 (left) and for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0
(right)
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Figure 38: Expected return for BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP for α = 0.9 and µ0 = 0.05 (left) and for α = 0. and µ0 = 0.1
(right)
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